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The Causal Effect of Radical Right Success on
Mainstream Parties’ Policy Positions: A Regression
Discontinuity Approach
TARIK ABOU-CHADI AND WERNER KRAUSE*
This article investigates how the success of radical right parties affects the policy positions of mainstream
parties. We do this using a regression discontinuity approach that allows us to causally attribute main-
stream parties’ positional changes to radical right strength independent of public opinion as a potential
confounder. Making use of exogenous variation created through differences in electoral thresholds, we
empirically demonstrate that radical right success, indeed, causally affects mainstream parties’ positions.
This is true for mainstream left as well as mainstream right parties. These findings make an important
contribution to the broader literature on party competition as they indicate that other parties’ behavior and
not only public opinion plays a crucial role in explaining parties’ policy shift.
Keywords: radical right; party competition; immigration.
While a growing literature on party competition has established that parties react to shifts in public
opinion,1 to election results2 and to voters’ issue priorities,3 so far much less attention has been
dedicated to the question of how parties react to each other’s behavior. Although some studies have
started looking into the question of how parties’ left–right shifts affect other parties,4 we know
comparatively little about parties’ interaction with each other and its effect on policy positions and
specific issues.5 Taking the idea of competition seriously, it should be of fundamental importance
to scholars of party competition if parties ‘only’ react to voters’ preferences and signals thereof, or
if the behavior of competitors has an independent effect on what other parties do. Hence, in this
article we investigate how parties shift their policy positions in response to successful radical right
challengers and use a novel empirical strategy to causally identify this effect.
New radical right parties have now become successful and established actors in a large share
of European democracies. This phenomenon has received wide attention from political
observers and has spurred a considerable amount of academic research. For a long time the most
salient question in this line of research has been why these parties are electorally successful in
some countries while they fail to achieve the same amount of success in others.6 While the
debate about these determinants and their interaction with each other is still ongoing,7 several
* Department of Political Science, University of Zurich (Email: tarik.abou-chadi@uzh.ch); Research Unit
‘Democracy and Democratization’, WZB Berlin Social Science Center (Email: werner.krause@wzb.eu). For
helpful comments the authors want to thank Pablo Barbera, Martin Kroh, Matthias Orlowski, Markus Wagner,
the editor and three anonymous reviewers. Data replication sets are available in Harvard Datavers at https://dx.
doi.org/10.7910/DVN/KYSD5S and online appendices at https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123418000029.
1 Adams et al. 2004; Adams et al. 2006.
2 Somer-Topcu 2009.
3 Klüver and Spoon 2016.
4 Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009; Williams 2015.
5 For notable exceptions see the more issue-competition-oriented work on challenger parties (de Vries and
Hobolt 2012; Hobolt and de Vries 2015) and the party system agenda (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2015).
6 See e.g. Arzheimer 2009; Golder 2003; Meguid 2005; van der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie 2005.
7 See Pardos-Prado 2015.
scholars have turned their attention to the previously much less studied question of the effect of
radical right success on the behavior of other parties. The main focus in this line of research lies
on the potentially ‘contagious’ effect of radical right parties, i.e. the question if their success
causes other parties to adopt more anti-immigrant and culturally protectionist positions.8 Most
quantitative comparative studies seem to confirm such an effect on anti-immigrant9 or more
broadly second dimension positions,10 while other studies shed some doubt on the existence of
radical right contagion and argue that their effect has been overstated.11 The key argument
against the contagion hypothesis states that the impact of the radical right has been
overestimated since it coincides with other developments that have led to a change in public
opinion and have thus caused mainstream parties to shift their position on immigration issues.12
And, indeed, while the comparative assessments by van Spanje, Abou-Chadi and Han find
empirical support for the claim that mainstream parties react to radical right success by
emphasizing more anti-immigrant positions, these studies cannot fully rule out that their
findings are driven by changes in public opinion rather than identifying a causal effect of the
success of the radical right. This debate thus reflects the broader and fundamentally important
question whether we can causally identify an effect of one party’s success on another party’s
behavior. Empirically establishing that one party reacts to another party’s success is
challenging. Since parties’ vote shares and public opinion are likely correlated, we do not
know if the success of one party causes another one to shift its position or if success and
positional shift are simply the result of a shift in public opinion that causes both.
In this article we tackle this issue by using a novel research design to study the contagious
effect of radical right parties. Employing a regression discontinuity design based on thresholds
of representation allows us to study the effect of radical right success independent of the effect
of public opinion. Electoral thresholds which are mainly a function of the electoral system
determine which vote share will lead to parliamentary representation of parties in the form of
seats.13 Exploiting these thresholds allows us to compare cases with similar radical right vote
share which differ in the representation of these parties in parliament. Parliamentary
representation provides radical right parties with additional resources and media attention
which increases the threat that they constitute for established parties. Since we exploit
exogenous variation based on electoral thresholds we can assess the causal effect of this threat
independent of public opinion, which we argue cannot be reliably controlled for in standard
regression approaches.
Analyzing party positions in twenty-three European countries in the period from 1980 to 2014
based on data provided by the CMP/MARPOR group with this design, we find a substantive and
statistically significant effect of radical right success on the positions of mainstream parties. This
effect is robust against a number of alternative operationalizations and specifications. We can also
provide evidence that the mainstream right as well as the mainstream left respond to radical right
success by shifting toward a more cultural protectionist position.
These findings have important implications for the literature on the new radical right as they
demonstrate that their success causally affects other parties. These parties’ electoral successes
are, thus, not only a symptom or by-product of the ‘right turn’ in European democracies,14 but a
8 Van Spanje 2010. For a similar argument on green parties see Spoon, Hobolt, and de Vries (2014).
9 Abou-Chadi 2016; Han 2015.
10 Wagner and Meyer 2017.
11 Akkerman 2015; Meyer and Rosenberger 2015; Mudde 2013.
12 See also Mudde 2007, 282–5.
13 Lijphart 1994; Taagepera 2002.
14 Mudde 2013.
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factor contributing to this development. Of course this should not be understood as an argument
that public opinion does not matter for the fate of the radical right or party competition more
generally. The goal of this article, however, is to empirically demonstrate that radical right
parties as agents shape the behavior of mainstream parties and to causally identify this effect.
On a more general level these findings contribute to the literature on party competition
because they demonstrate that parties’ behavior has an impact on other parties’ strategies that
goes beyond a signaling of public opinion. Moreover, they indicate that these reactions do not
only take place on the main left–right axis of political competition but also on other issues such
as immigration. These findings should thus encourage scholars of party competition to further
investigate the complex interactions of parties as they matter independent of public attitudes.
RADICAL RIGHT SUCCESS AND MAINSTREAM PARTY BEHAVIOR
In order to explain the causes of parties’ policy shifts, scholars have largely relied on the spatial
conception of party competition first introduced by Downs.15 Following from a rational act of
voting that is based on ideological proximity (voters vote for the party ideologically closest to
them), parties have an incentive to react to changes in public opinion and adjust their policy
positions accordingly. However, facing fundamental uncertainty about voters’ preferences,
vote-seeking parties have to rely on signals about these preferences. Elections constitute the
most important of these signals.16 Building on these assumptions a growing literature has
investigated how parties react to public opinion, elections and sub-groups of the population.17
However, the same framework indicates that in order to understand parties’ policy shifts, it is
necessary to take into account other parties’ behavior – a question that so far has seen far less
scholarly attention.18
As already Downs points out using the example of the States’ Right Party or ‘Dixiecrats’,
new challenger parties can play a crucial role for this dynamic.19 While the goal of the new
party might not even be to gain office or win an election, it has the potential to make other
parties shift in the direction of its preferred policy position. What is crucial here is that the
challenger party affects other parties’ behavior independent of the voter distribution. Its success
causes other parties to shift their position because the competitive space has changed. The
established party does not shift its position because of a shift in voter preferences but to affect
the fate of another party – ‘to take the wind out of its sails’.20
Studying the success of radical right parties, several authors indeed argue that radical right
success should cause mainstream parties to shift their positions. Leaving the left–right
dimension and focusing on party competition in the two-dimensional post-industrial political
space, scholars have argued that the success of radical right parties constitutes a fundamental
challenge for established parties and that their reactions will largely concern issues such as
immigration and multiculturalism.21 Faced with a credible threat from a niche party, mainstream
parties have an incentive to move their position toward the position of the niche party in order to
keep the niche party from stealing their votes at subsequent elections. In the words of Bonnie
Meguid, mainstream parties can apply an accommodative strategy in order to steal a niche
15 Downs 1957.
16 Budge 1994.
17 For a summary see Adams (2012).
18 For notable exceptions see Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009; Williams 2015.
19 Downs 1957, 131.
20 Downs 1957, 131.
21 Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Kriesi et al. 2008; Meguid 2005.
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party’s issue ownership.22 This strategy is especially electorally appealing as niche parties
mostly compete on a single issue. If they lose their appeal on this issue they are likely to lose a
lot of electoral support. Similar to Downs’ example about the Dixiecrats, the success of a radical
right party here causes other parties to shift their position independent of the underlying voter
distribution. In this account, the radical right party itself is an actor and not just a signal or by-
product of public opinion.
Empirically, several small-N studies have documented and portrayed how the success of
radical right parties leads to the adaption of other parties’ behavior.23 Because competition with
the radical right is not limited to the left-right dimension and concerns cross-cutting issues such
as immigration, these reactions are not limited to the mainstream right but can be equally found
among the mainstream left.24 In contrast to this, some recent analyses cast doubt on the
contagious effect of the radical right and argue that their impact has been overstated in academic
and public debates.25 While there is little doubt that immigration has become a salient political
issue in most European democracies, these studies argue that this development cannot be
attributed to the success of the radical right26 and that in some countries mainstream parties
started competing on this issue even before there was a successful radical right party.27
Following this interpretation, especially parties of the mainstream right have contributed to
politicization of the immigration issue by increasingly adopting an anti-immigrant stance.28
In contrast, three large-N comparative studies have found a positive effect of radical right vote
share on mainstream parties’ anti-immigrant or anti-multiculturalism positions.29 Using party
positions on the immigration issue from expert surveys, van Spanje30 demonstrates that where
radical right parties were stronger in the 1990s, mainstream parties show more anti-immigrant
positions in the 2000s. Similarly, based on party positions extracted from manifesto data, Abou-
Chadi and Han31 demonstrate that mainstream parties emphasize more anti-immigrant or anti-
multiculturalism positions when radical right parties received higher vote shares at the previous
election. While the effects are (slightly) more pronounced for parties of the mainstream right, all
three studies show that parties of the mainstream left are also affected by radical right success.
While all three studies, thus, show an association between the threat posed by a successful
radical right contender and mainstream parties’ anti-immigrant positions, as a consequence of
the applied designs, important doubts remain about the identification of a causal effect of the
radical right on other parties’ behavior. Taking a counterfactual perspective the crucial question
is: in absence of a successful radical right challenger would we not have seen a shift in policy
position? Hence, a main concern for causally identifying the effect of radical right parties on the
behavior of other parties lies in the effect of public opinion as a potential confounder.32 If public
opinion shifts towards a more anti-immigrant stance then this should cause both an increase in
radical right strength as well as stronger anti-immigrant positions by mainstream parties. There
22 Meguid 2005; Meguid 2008.
23 Bale et al. 2010; Minkenberg 2001; Schain 1987.
24 Bale et al. 2010.
25 For a summary see Mudde (2013).
26 Akkerman 2015.
27 Van Heerden et al. 2014.
28 See also Bale 2003; Bale 2008.
29 Wagner and Meyer (2017) also show that radical right success affects the positions of mainstream parties on
second dimension issues more generally.
30 Van Spanje 2010.
31 Abou-Chadi 2016; Han 2015.
32 There are of course also other potential sources of bias. E.g. only one of the studies controls for the size of
immigration to a country.
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is broad empirical evidence that indeed both of these mechanisms seem to be prevalent within
multiparty competition. First, several studies demonstrate that mainstream parties are responsive
to shifts in public opinion.33 While these studies focus on parties’ left–right movements, we
should expect this to be equally the case for issues surrounding immigration. Secondly, attitudes
toward immigration have been shown to be the number one predictor of voting for a radical
right party.34 At the aggregate level, we should thus expect anti-immigrant attitudes and radical
right vote shares to covary. Hence, finding a correlation between radical right success and anti-
immigrant positions of mainstream parties is potentially spurious.35 In addition to that, public
opinion is a latent construct that is difficult to measure and hardly possible to control for. Han36
does include a measure of public opinion based on the aggregation of a survey data item.
However, the problem with such a measure remains that it is nearly impossible to account for all
variation in public opinion that might be a source of confounding. Hence, what is necessary to
identify if mainstream parties, indeed, react to the success of a radical right party, is a research
design that permits analyzing the effect of radical right success on mainstream party positions
independent of public opinion.
RESEARCH DESIGN
In this article we employ a regression discontinuity design and use radical right parties’
representation in parliament as an indicator of the threat that they pose to established parties.
While a radical right party gaining a minimum of one seat might not seem a dramatic event,
parliamentary representation provides radical right parties with a significant increase in
resources and media attention, and will make their survival as political contenders much more
likely.37 Hence, when radical right challengers achieve representation in parliament we should
expect mainstream parties to react more strongly to their success as they have proven to be a
viable contender that now commands an increased amount of resources. Parliamentary
representation will also affect future voting decisions by reducing strategic voting against these
parties. In short, parliamentary representation provides radical right parties with a multitude of
monetary, strategic and symbolic resources which make these parties a more credible challenger
in future contests – and indeed Dinas et al.38 demonstrate that parliamentary representation
profoundly increases the likelihood of new party survival. Having crossed the watershed of
parliamentary representation, radical right parties thus demonstrate that under current
circumstances they are likely to remain a competitor for the long run. Previous to radical
right parties’ representation in parliament mainstream parties may consider the politicization of
immigration as too risky and might still hope for, for example, a disappearance of the radical
right party due to within-party struggles. However, once radical right parties signal their
presence as a stable and credible challenger, mainstream parties have a strong incentive to
accommodate their main issue.
Parliamentary representation is of course as much a function of public opinion as vote share
per se. Moreover, selection into parliament will depend on factors such as the quality of parties’
33 Adams 2012.
34 Ivarsflaten 2007; Norris 2005.
35 This does not mean that radical right success is solely a function of public opinion. The literature on the
radical right has identified many factors that play a role for their success. We do not know, however, if the
variation in radical right strength that explains mainstream parties’ policy shifts covaries with public opinion.
36 Han 2015.
37 Dinas, Riera, and Roussias 2015.
38 Dinas, Riera, and Roussias 2015.
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leaders or their organizational capacities39 which, in turn, should affect other parties’ reactions.
However, representation in parliament is also a function of a country’s electoral system. Since this
threshold of representation is exogenous to party behavior, we can exploit the variation that is
caused by it to identify the effect of radical right success on other parties’ anti-immigrant positions.
The regression discontinuity (RD) design allows us to estimate the causal effect of RRP
presence in parliament on mainstream parties’ positional shifts on immigration in a quasi-
experimental setting. The basic idea of the RD design is to identify variation in a cause by
means of exploiting an exogenous, institutional cut-off point that assigns treatment. In our case,
this rule of treatment assignment is the electoral threshold as an idiosyncratic feature of electoral
systems: mainstream parties that compete in party systems in which RRPs have closely failed to
surpass the electoral threshold are not exposed to parliamentary RRP pressure, while those
where radical right parties have just managed to surpass the electoral threshold are forced to
deal with RRPs in parliament. Since we are comparing situations with similar RRP vote shares,
we can rule out public opinion as a confounder. Hence, we use the RD design as a concept that
allows us to employ a counterfactual comparison of mainstream parties’ position shifts with and
without RRP presence in parliament. The causal effect is defined as the difference between the
potential outcome under treatment and the potential outcome under control:
τ = E½ΔYðD = 1ÞΔYðD = 0Þ; (1)
where ΔY(D) is a potential mainstream party-shift while D=1 if a RRP has managed to enter the
parliament and D=0 otherwise. The validity of the RD design rests on a continuity assumption,40
which implies that mainstream parties, which are just exposed to RRP presence in parliament and
those that are just ‘free’ of parliamentary RRP pressure, show no significant differences in their
characteristics with the consequence that both groups do not vary from each other except for their
treatment status. For instance, the threshold of parliamentary representation is set to 3 per cent in the
Greek electoral system. Here, it should be of little relevance for Greek mainstream parties whether a
RRP gained a vote share right above or below 3 per cent apart from the fact that the corresponding
radical right challenger has managed in the first case to gain parliamentary representation, but not in
the latter. Given that this assumption holds, we can exploit the discontinuity induced by the
institutional cut-off point in order to identify the causal effect of RRP presence in parliament without
having to rely on the assumption – as it is the case in commonly used regression designs – that all
relevant confounding factors have been considered. The crucial idea is, thus, that in a narrow window
around the threshold confounders do not affect treatment assignment. As a consequence of this,
changes in an outcome variable can be attributed to the change in treatment status induced by an
assignment variable that determines whether the threshold is surpassed or not. In our case, the
treatment status (RRP presence in parliament) is a function of the electoral support for radical right
parties. Hence, what the RD design helps us to achieve is that we can exploit variation in the threat of
radical right success that is independent of public opinion.
As outlined by Lee,41 the continuity assumption also implies that political parties can neither
perfectly predict nor control the electoral outcome of RRPs. Otherwise local random assignment
of treatment and control groups would not be possible. While the continuity can never be
completely tested, it seems plausible in the context of RRP success. In this setting, perfect
control over RRPs’ electoral results would only be possible by means of electoral fraud or a
strategic manipulation of the electoral threshold.42 In these situations, political parties could rig
39 Dinas, Riera, and Roussias 2015.
40 Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw 2001.
41 Lee 2008.
42 Eggers et al. 2015.
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election results in order to push competitors above or below the threshold. In line with previous
research,43 we assume that electoral fraud is not present in our sample of European democracies.
Nevertheless, the history of European party systems knows (rare) cases in which mainstream
parties indeed changed electoral laws in order to either facilitate the entry of small parties or to
prevent them from gaining access to the national parliament. One famous example for this is the
1985 decision of the then French president François Mitterrand to abolish the two-ballot
majoritarian system in favor of party-list proportional representation which guaranteed that the
Front National (FN) would enter the Assemblée Nationale.44 However, in this case the
(effective) electoral threshold was set at a much lower level than the FN was expected to gain.
In other cases, mainstream parties increased the threshold in order to prevent small party
representation in parliament. However, the newly institutionalized electoral thresholds clearly
exceeded the anticipated electoral support of the targeted political parties.45 All in all, we
assume that political parties cannot perfectly control the entrance of RRPs into parliament in a
close window around the threshold and that the basic assumptions of the RD design hold for the
following analysis.46
The RD design necessitates that assignment to treatment changes discontinuously at a cut-off
point. In our case, this assignment is complicated by the rules of European election systems. On
the one hand, nationwide electoral thresholds seldom represent exclusive rules and are
frequently complemented by additional provisions of the electoral law allowing small parties to
enter parliament without surpassing the former. For instance, in German general elections the
nationwide threshold is set to 5 per cent of the vote share. However, parties winning at least one
single-member district will, independently of their nationwide electoral support, gain one seat in
the German Bundestag. On the other hand, several European countries have not instituted a
legal threshold at all. In these cases we rely on the effective nationwide threshold proposed by
Taagepera.47 However, this estimation technique is defined as an approximation to the vote
share necessary to gain at least one seat in parliament. Hence, it is possible that parties with a
vote share below this estimated threshold gain a seat and vice versa.
The following sections will show that none of these specific cases are present in our dataset
so that we are dealing with a so-called sharp RD design.48 The treatment status D is, thus, a
deterministic function of the assignment variable x with the property that D= 0 if x< c and
D= 1 if x≥ c, where c denotes the electoral threshold. This allows us to identify the treatment
effect (τ) by the following regression formula:49
ΔYm = α + τDm + β1ðxiciÞ + β2ðxiciÞDm + ϵm; ð2Þ
where m refers to mainstream parties and i to election specific characteristics. Importantly,
the causal effect identified by means of the RD design only refers to elections where RRPs
just managed or failed to enter the parliament. Hence, the causal impact of the forcing variable
43 Hainmüller and Kern 2008.
44 Schain 1987.
45 See Dinas, Riera, and Roussias (2015) for a brief discussion of the Greek and Turkish cases.
46 One common empirical strategy to evaluate the local randomization assumption is to test for a discontinuity
in the distribution of the assignment variable at the cut-off point (McCrary 2008). In our case, the null of no
discontinuity cannot be rejected (p-value= 0.582) with the consequence that composition bias does not constitute
a problem for our analysis.
47 Taagepera 2002.
48 Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw 2001.
49 An interaction between the treatment dummy and the assignment variable is included in this specification to
allow for different slopes on both sides of the cut-off point.
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is not generalized to the entire population. The analysis identifies local average treatment effects
(LATE).
Two ways of modeling the conditional expectations of the RD design have been discussed in
the literature: non-parametric, local linear regressions and parametric linear models.50 In the first
case, the sample is restricted to a certain bandwidth h away from the cut-off point so that
ci− h≤ xi≤ ci+ h. Based on this, a local linear function on the resulting set of observations is
estimated. We employ a triangular kernel in order to give more weight to election results
closer to the cut-off.51 In the second case, the entire sample along with a global high-order
polynomial function of (xi− ci) is used. As pointed out by Lee and Lemieux,
52 both approaches
can lead to valid results given the specific characteristics of the underlying data. Since our
dataset is characterized by a small sample size around the cut-off point, we use a variety of
bandwidths and polynomial specifications to verify the stability of our results. All our models
additionally include country fixed effects and standard errors are clustered within parties and
elections.
DATA AND OPERATIONALIZATION
Three indicators constitute the central variables of the RD design: the outcome variable, the
assignment variable and the cut-off-point. Our outcome is a mainstream party’s policy shift on
the immigration issue between election t and election t− 1. To assess parties’ policy positions
we make use of the data provided by the CMP/MARPOR project.53 The CMP/MARPOR
dataset has been the object of considerable debate. Its advantages and disadvantages have been
discussed elsewhere,54 but it remains the only dataset available that spans a time period long
enough to evaluate our hypothesis.55 Unfortunately the CMP data do not include items directly
referring to immigration policy positions. We thus construct our main dependent variable based
on the items per607 (‘Multiculturalism: Positive’) and per608 (‘Multiculturalism: Negative’),
representing appeals to cultural protectionism, a core issue of the radical right agenda.56 In
addition, these items also constitute the main dependent variables in the studies by Han and
Abou-Chadi, which assures comparability between our results and theirs. In the Appendix, we
additionally demonstrate that our findings equally hold for broader measures of policy positions,
which have been suggested to represent anti-immigrant positions57 and the core of the radical
right agenda.58 Following the suggestions by Lowe et al.59 that concern the scaling of positions
extracted from manifesto data, we logit transform our dependent variable.60 Positive values on
this scale then indicate more culturally protectionist positions.
We conduct our analysis for a sample of twenty-three European democracies. Since we want to
focus on mainstream parties’ reactions, and because several scholars have demonstrated that small
50 Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw 2001; van der Klaauw 2002.
51 Fan and Gijbels 1996.
52 Lee and Lemieux 2010.
53 Volkens et al. 2015.
54 See for instance Gemenis 2013; Meyer 2013.
55 While the Chapel Hill expert survey by now encompasses a quite considerable time series, parties’ positions
on immigration have only been part of the three most recent surveys.
56 Norris 2005.
57 Alonso and da Fonseca 2012.
58 Meguid 2008.
59 Lowe et al. 2011.
60 All our findings are robust when only using item per608 or if we construct the dependent variable following
Kim and Fording 2003.
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and niche parties follow different incentives from their mainstream competitors,61 we include only
those parties with an average vote share of at least 10 per cent in general elections since 1960.
Radical right parties are excluded from this sample independently of their electoral performance.
The electoral support of radical right parties in election t− 1 constitutes the assignment
variable. In order to obtain vote shares that are as exact as possible, it is necessary to include
radical right parties that have gained vote shares well below the level usually reported by
datasets on elections in Europe. For that reason, the election results of the corresponding
strongest radical right parties have been collected for all general elections since 1980.62 The
categorization of radical right parties has been discussed intensely in the literature.63 For the
present analysis, we build on the categorizations put forward by Mudde64 for Western Europe
and Bustikova65 with regard to the Eastern European countries of our sample.
The Appendix gives a detailed outline on which parties and countries were included or had to
be excluded from the analysis.
As our cut-off-point we use the nationwide thresholds of representation of the European election
systems. We have already mentioned that only a part of the country sample under study makes use
of a legally defined nationwide threshold. In the remaining countries, thresholds cannot be directly
inferred from electoral laws. Based on previous research,66 we calculated in these cases the so-
called effective nationwide threshold. Building on the ‘threshold of inclusion’ first suggested by
Rokkan67 and the ‘threshold of exclusion’ proposed by Rae et al.,68 Taagepera defines the effective
threshold as ‘an average threshold of representation . . . where parties have a 50–50 chance of
winning their first seat’.69 For that purpose, Taagepera identifies the total number of seats in the
assembly (S) and the number of electoral districts (E) to calculate the effective threshold:
T =
75%
S
E + 1
  ffiffiffiEp  (3)
The validity of the effective threshold has been questioned regarding its use in the context of plurality-
majoritarian systems.70 Following this criticism, plurality-majoritarian as well as mixed-member
majoritarian systems71 are excluded from the analysis. Table 1 lists our resulting sample as well as the
corresponding legally defined or estimated effective thresholds.72 Since the effective threshold is not
purely determined by electoral institutions but also depends on the behavior of parties, we additionally
run our models limiting our sample to cases with a legal threshold. Lastly, it is important to mention
that the vote shares of radical right parties have been centered around the corresponding national
thresholds in order to ensure that the effect of entering the parliament can be measured across countries.
61 Abou-Chadi and Orlowski 2016; Adams et al. 2006.
62 For that purpose, we rely on data provided by the CMP/MARPOR dataset as well as several sources of
election results such as Döring and Manow 2012, Nohlen and Stöver 2010, and data reported by national election
commissions. See table A1 in the Appendix for a full list of the identified radical right parties in Europe.
63 Mudde 1996.
64 Mudde 2007.
65 Bustikova 2014.
66 Lijphart 1994; Taagepera 1998; Taagepera 2002.
67 Rokkan 1968.
68 Rae, Hanby, and Loosemore 1971.
69 Taagepera 2002, 383.
70 Bischoff 2009.
71 See Shugart and Wattenberg 2001.
72 The number of electoral districts has been derived from Golder 2006; Lijphart 1994; Pilet and Renwick
2015; as well as the database on national parliaments of the Interparliamentary Union (2015). Importantly, if
leveling seats were in use, the sum of these was subtracted from the total number of seats in parliament.
Effect of Radical Right Success 9
RESULTS
A first way of evaluating effects within a regression discontinuity design is a graphical
representation of the outcome depending on the values of the treatment variable. In Figure 1 we
show the changes in parties’ anti-immigration positions depending on the vote share of radical
right parties at the previous election. The dashed line marks our cut-off point depending on the
electoral threshold and the solid lines represent cubic fits with 95 per cent confidence intervals.
TABLE 1 Election Thresholds in Europe, 1975–2014
Threshold
Country Elections Districts Seats Effective Fixed
Austria 1975–90, 1994–2013 9 183 1.17 4
Bulgaria 1997–2005 4
2013–14 4
Croatia 2000–11 10 140* 1.58
Czech Republic 1998–2013 5
Denmark 1975–2005 17 135* 2.03
2007–11 10 135* 1.64
Estonia 2003–11 5
Finland 1975–2011 15 200 1.35
Germany 1976–2013 5
Greece 1977–90, 1993–2012 56 300 1.58 3
Ireland 1977 42 148 2.56
1981–97 41 166 2.32
2002 42 166 2.34
2007–11 43 166 2.35
Italy 1976–92 32 630 0.64
2006–13 4
Latvia 2002–11 5
Luxembourg 1979–2013 2.95**
Netherlands 1977–2012 0.67
Norway 1977–81 19 155 1.88
1985 19 157 1.86
1989–2001 19 157* 1.86
2005–13 19 150* 1.93
Poland 2001–11 5
Portugal 1975 20 246* 1.26
1976 20 259* 1.20
1979–87 20 246* 1.26
1991–2011 20 226* 1.36
Romania 2000–12 5
Slovakia 1998–2012 5
Slovenia 2000–14 4
Spain 1977–2011 52 350 1.35
Sweden 1976–2010 4
Switzerland 1975–9 25 200 1.67
1983–2011 26 200 1.69
Notes: * Levelling seats and seats reserved for minorities have been subtracted from the total number
of seats in parliament.
**In the case of Luxembourg, the empirical threshold (Taagepera 1989) has been applied in order to
account for misspecification resulting from electors’ option to split their vote between different
parties (see e.g. Dumont and Poirier 2005).
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First, we can see that the application of a sharp RD design is justified. All radical right parties
left of the cut-off point did not gain any seats in their corresponding national assemblies while
all RRPs to the right did. Second, a ‘jump’ at the cut-off point is clearly visible. In cases where
radical right parties surpass the threshold of representation we witness an on average much
larger shift in mainstream parties’ anti-immigrant positions. Hence, Figure 1 provides a first
strong indication for a causal effect of radical right success on other parties’ policy positions
that is independent of public opinion.
We should emphasize again that the vote shares on the x-axis are calibrated with the effective
threshold. This means that negative values indicate how much the vote share was below and
positive values how much it was above the threshold. This also means that we cannot simply
interpret the scatter plot as a linear relationship between radical right vote share and mainstream
party position shifts. Hence, while a first look at Figure 1 may seem to indicate that increasing
vote shares above the threshold do not lead to stronger shifts, this interpretation should not be
made from the graph as values on the x-axis are calibrated to the threshold and are thus not one
to one transferable to vote shares.73
Table 2 presents our findings for the local average treatment effect using parametric as well as
non-parametric estimation techniques. For both techniques and different order polynomials we
find a highly statistically significant effect of a radical right party’s representation in parliament
on other parties’ anti-immigrant positions. This effect is not only statistically significant but also
substantively meaningful. The local average treatment effect of 3 (resulting from a non-
parametric specification with a first order polynomial) is about twice as high as the standard
deviation of positional shifts in our sample. This is in size similar to the positional difference
between the Dutch center-right VVD and the center-left PvDA in the year 2010.
Hence, our findings provide strong empirical evidence that radical right success has a causal and
substantive impact on the positions of other parties. Our design allows us to rule out public opinion
as a potential confounder and thus underlines the claim that radical right success is not simply a
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Fig. 1. Mainstream party position change on cultural protectionism
Note: The solid lines plot the cubic fit and the shaded areas denote the 95 per cent confidence bands.
73 In fact, a simple linear regression shows an association between radical right vote share and mainstream
party positions even above the threshold.
Effect of Radical Right Success 11
by-product of a right-turn in Western Europe but in itself a driving force of this process. On a more
general level, those findings, thus, also demonstrate that parties react to other parties’ success
independent of public opinion. We should emphasize that this does not mean that parties generally
do not react to public opinion. It solely indicates that there is an effect of the competitive space that
parties interact in that cannot be reduced to public attitudes and signals thereof. We should also
emphasize that this does not mean that vote shares capture all variation in public opinion. What our
design allows us to do is to rule out that the variation in radical right vote share that determines
reactions of mainstream parties is confounded by public opinion or other unobserved third variables.
An additional interesting question in this regard is if mainstream left as well as mainstream
right parties react to the success of radical right parties. While based on the traditional spatial
model of party competition one should expect that parties of the mainstream right react more
strongly to the success of the radical right, research in this field has repeatedly pointed out that
radical right and mainstream left parties also compete for a similar segment of voters.74 In the
two-dimensional space of post-industrial societies, both mainstream left and mainstream right
parties have incentives to shift toward a more anti-immigrant and culturally protectionist
position when faced with a successful radical right contender.75
Tables 3 and 4 show the results of the RD analysis for samples divided between mainstream
left and mainstream right parties.76 We find a significant positive effect for both mainstream left
as well as mainstream right parties, which is robust and substantively meaningful. For
mainstream left parties the substantive effect varies between 3 and 4 and thus is quite similar to
the overall sample. While the values for mainstream right parties are generally higher, we can
see relatively strong fluctuation depending on the exact specification. One reason for this is of
course the substantially reduced sample size. Nonetheless, we can clearly see that there is a
substantive and significant effect for mainstream left as well as mainstream right parties. Hence,
if radical right parties surpass the threshold of representation then mainstream left and
mainstream right parties alike shift their position. Again, our design allows us to causally
identify this effect and rule out public opinion as a potential confounder.
ROBUSTNESS AND PLACEBO TESTS
In order to demonstrate the robustness of our findings in the following section, we present
several additional analyses. Table 2 has already demonstrated that our results are not sensitive to
TABLE 2 Mainstream Party Position Change on Cultural Protectionism
LATE St. Err. Bandwidth Polynomial Approach N< c N≥ c
3.072*** 0.643 3.315 1 Non-Parametric 214 32
4.388*** 1.184 3.315 2 Non-Parametric 214 32
3.777*** 0.820 global 3 Parametric 272 119
4.853*** 1.003 global 4 Parametric 272 119
Note: Country-fixed effects and two-way clustered standard errors used. Bandwidth estimation
according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009). *p< .1, **p< .05, ***p< .01.
74 Kitschelt and McGann 1995.
75 Bale et al. 2010; Wagner and Meyer 2017.
76 For this purpose, the average Left-Right score of the individual parties has been considered. If a party’s
mean score is below the country-specific average, it is considered mainstream left. Otherwise it is treated as
mainstream right.
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varying specifications of the polynomial control function. One further issue that surrounds the
validity of RD designs is the choice of the optimal bandwidth. If the estimated local average
treatment effect were sensitive to varying sizes of this window, this would cast serious doubts
on the validity of the presented results. Figure 2 shows how our local average treatment effect
varies with different bandwidths ranging from 1.5 per cent to 10 per cent. The optimal
bandwidth used for the previous calculations has been 3.3. We can see that for any other
specification we similarly find a statistically significant and substantively meaningful effect of
radical right success on anti-immigrant positions. The predicted effect consistently lies between
2 and 5. None of the confidence intervals includes the value 0.
Tables A6, A7 and A8 in the Appendix present three placebo tests which further underline
that our analysis, indeed, constitutes a causal identification of the effect of radical right success
on mainstream parties’ policy shifts. In table A6 we can see our analysis using arbitrary cut-off
points that differ from the nationwide threshold. Following Imbens and Lemieux77 we test for
discontinuities at the median of the two samples on both sides of the cut-off point. We should
not expect a jump at any of these points. And, indeed, for none of these fake cut-off values do
we find a significant effect.
Table A7 shows our analysis for a different dependent variable, namely changes in positions on
environmental protection.78 Since radical right parties are barely associated with these issues, their
success should not have an impact on other parties’ positions on environmental issues. Looking at
the results in table A7, we can see that there is, indeed, no statistically significant effect.
Since parties take considerable time drafting their manifestos, if mainstream parties truly react
to radical right parties, there should not be a discontinuous effect of the vote share of a radical
TABLE 4 Mainstream Right Party Position Change on Cultural Protectionism
LATE St. Err. Bandwidth Polynomial Approach N< c N≥ c
3.435*** 0.765 3.515 1 Non-Parametric 121 11
7.951*** 1.851 3.515 2 Non-Parametric 121 11
4.164*** 0.857 Global 3 Parametric 148 60
6.312*** 1.345 Global 4 Parametric 148 60
Note: Country-fixed effects and two-way clustered standard errors used. Bandwidth estimation
according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009). *p< .1, **p< .05, ***p< .01.
TABLE 3 Mainstream Left Party Position Change on Cultural Protectionism
LATE St. Err. Bandwidth Polynomial Approach N< c N≥ c
2.996*** 0.868 2.999 1 Non-Parametric 91 19
2.157** 0.928 2.999 2 Non-Parametric 91 19
3.685*** 1.008 Global 3 Parametric 124 59
4.067*** 1.237 Global 4 Parametric 124 59
Note: Country-fixed effects and two-way clustered standard errors used. Bandwidth estimation
according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009). *p< .1, **p< .05, ***p< .01.
77 Imbens and Lemieux 2008, 632.
78 Measured using the items per410 (‘Economic Growth: Positive’), per416 (‘Anti-Growth Economy: Posi-
tive’) and per501 (‘Environmental Protection: Positive’) from the manifesto dataset.
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right party at the same election. Table A8 thus presents our analysis using radical right vote
share at election t instead of t − 1. Again, we do not find a statistically significant effect. All
three placebo tests thus support the idea that the findings of our main analysis constitute a causal
effect of radical right success on mainstream parties’ positions.
In order to assure that our findings are not driven by a single country, we conduct jackknife
analyses.79 Table A9 in the Appendix shows how effect size and statistical significance of our
treatment effect vary with the successive exclusion of single countries from the analysis. The
resulting differences in the size of our τ-coefficients are marginal and for the first order
polynomial, for example, only vary between 2.8 and 4.1. We also find statistically significant
effects for all cases.
As discussed before, using the effective threshold as a cut-off point for a regression
discontinuity design involves the problem that these thresholds are not only determined by
electoral institutions and are thus not completely exogenous. Hence, in the following section we
repeat our analysis with a sample limited to countries with a legal threshold.
LEGAL THRESHOLDS
Figure 3 shows the relationship between radical right vote share at t − 1 and changes in
mainstream parties’ positions now only for cases with a legal threshold. Again we can see a
clear jump around the cut-off point indicating a causal effect of radical right success.
The results in Table 5 confirm a statistically significant local average treatment effect.
Although the number of cases is substantially reduced, we find this significant effect for all four
different specifications. The substantive size of the effect is very similar to the one we found
using the effective threshold.
In sum, several robustness tests as well as an analysis limited to legal thresholds support our
initial findings. The success of radical right parties causes other parties to shift towards more cultural
protectionism. We can rule out that these shifts are caused by public opinion as a confounder.
First order polynomial Second order polynomial
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Fig. 2. LATE under varying bandwidths
79 Efron and Tibshirani 1993.
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CONCLUSION
In this article we demonstrate that established parties react to the success of radical right
challengers by emphasizing more anti-immigrant and culturally protectionist positions. While
there is general agreement in the literature that immigration has become one of the most salient
issues in the European political space, the question of how the success of the radical right has
contributed to this phenomenon has remained far more debated. Although several comparative
studies have demonstrated an association of radical right success and other parties’ anti-
immigrant positions, they could not fully exclude the possibility that radical right success is a
by-product instead of a causal factor of these developments.
Using a regression discontinuity design, in this study we are able to causally attribute shifts in
mainstream party positions to the success of the radical right. If these parties gain representation
in parliament we observe a strong move towards an anti-immigrant stance by other political
parties. These findings have important implications for the literature on the radical right as well
as party competition more generally. First, they show that the radical right as an actor plays a
fundamental role in the politicization of the immigration issue – they do not simply constitute a
symptom of a larger development. Second, they demonstrate that the transformation of the
political space in Western Europe that we are currently witnessing is not simply a reaction to
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Fig. 3. Mainstream party position change on cultural protectionism, countries with legally fixed threshold.
Note: The solid lines plot the cubic fit and the shaded areas denote the 95 per cent confidence bands.
TABLE 5 Mainstream Party Position Change on Cultural Protectionism, Countries with
Legally Defined Electoral Thresholds
LATE St. Err. Bandwidth Polynomial Approach N< c N≥ c
2.666*** 0.657 3.790 Non-Parametric 1 47 27
3.602*** 0.814 3.790 Non-Parametric 2 47 27
4.186*** 0.465 Global Parametric 3 95 59
3.487*** 0.704 Global Parametric 4 95 59
Note: Country-fixed effects and two-way clustered standard errors used. Bandwidth estimation
according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009). *p< .1, **p< .05, ***p< .01.
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shifting preferences of the European electorate, but is a result of the strategic interaction of
political parties. Third, in relation to a more general literature on party competition they
underline that parties do not only follow shifts on the demand side of the electoral market, but
react to other parties’ behavior.
Now it has been established that radical right success causally affects established parties’
anti-immigrant positions, further research should turn to questions of contextual factors and
especially sequencing effects. Are we largely witnessing breakthrough effects or are these
dynamics playing out similarly when radical right parties have established themselves as
parliamentary actors? What are the strategic responses of radical right parties against these
accommodative strategies of mainstream parties?
The findings of this article not only have important implications for the political science
literature but for the broader debate surrounding the success of radical right parties. They show
that these parties’ ascent has a substantial effect on the behavior of established parties, and that
institutional representation seems to constitute a watershed within this process. Hence, the
transformation of political discourse and, more generally, of the political space that we are
currently witnessing is likely one that is fundamental and lasting, rather than short-lived and
superficial.
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